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Abstract
In the human capital literature, it is usually assumed that human cap-
ital is paid according to its marginal productivity. Nevertheless, in the
real world labor compensation is linked to a xed hierarchy due to the
division and organization of labor. Access to privileged positions in the
hierarchy depends on schooling credentials, which in turn are a function
of individual learning abilities and of individual spending in education.
People compete in education in order to achieve the best job positions:
positional competition is like a rent-seeking activity, based on the dier-
ent levels of credentials. In this paper, a simple OLG economy with two
agents and two kinds of jobs is modeled, and the strategic solutions are
analyzed. The model shows dierent outcomes depending on the hypothe-
ses regarding the type of strategic interaction (sequential or simultaneous)
and the characteristics of the capital market. In the sequential equilib-
rium, the presence of credit market imperfections and risk-aversion makes
the asympthotic wealth distribution dependent on initial conditions (non
ergodicity). In the simultaneous equilibrium, a non monotonic relation-
ship between income inequality and long run growth is shown; in the long
run, job allocation is mainly determined by the innate learning abilities
and it is unrelated to the initial wealth distribution (ergodicity).
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1 Introduction
Recent literature on growth theory has renewed economists' interest in the deci-
sions of investment in education and accumulation of human capital, underlining
the relationships between distribution of income, human capital and economic
growth.
1
From the point of view of a single agent, investing in education is
mainly a way to signal his individual ability; that is each subject invests in
education in order to get a better job.
2
If individual human capital is not trans-
ferable and the capital market is imperfect, the amount of inherited wealth
is crucial in establishing the investment in education. Since education repre-
sents the main way to better one's economic condition
3
, a complex relationship
emerges between educational choices and the dynamics of income distribution.
In this paper, we aim to investigate this relationship by means of a model of po-
sitional competition on the labour market
4
. According to Hirsch (1976), agents
try to acquire credentials by investing in education, to distinguish themselves
from others and to get a privileged role in the organization of production (and
therefore a higher income or more social prestige
5
). If the organization of roles
is xed and, with the development of the economic system, the number of the
privileged roles does not increase at the same pace as the number of agents
investing in education, then, as time passes, an increasing level of investment
in education is required to get the same socio-economic roles (the quantity of
"intermediate" good increases without any change in the nal output: an ineÆ-
cient outcome). As we know, in the real world the number of high paying (high
prestige) positions does not increase with the number of individuals with a high
degree of education
6
. This yields to a competition among individuals in order
to get such positions, competition which takes place through the investment in
education. Such an investment, independently from the increase of productivity
that it might involve, acts like a signal.
Although each agent competes against an indenite number of subjects (all
the potential aspirants for the same role), it is possible to assume that in a
labour market characterized by a xed number of high-paying positions, the
behavior of agents should be strategic. It would be useless for a poor agent
to invest money and time (which also involves an opportunity cost equal to
the time spent without working as an unskilled worker) to compete with other
agents whose level of education is far greater. In this respect, it is rational for
the poor agents to immediately undertake an unskilled activity, choosing not to
invest
7
.
We assume that the economy is characterised by a particular institutional
setting, where the available working positions are xed over time (the types and
number of available jobs and relative wages are exogenous
8
). In this institu-
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See [11], [10], [8], [7], [5].
2
See [20], [4], [23].
3
See [18].
4
On positional competition, see [14]. Orsini (1997) presents a simulation of a model with
positional competition by education among heterogeneous agents.
5
See [9].
6
Davis - Haltiwanger (1991) provide some interesting empirical evidence about this trend
in the United States after 1975.
7
In the model, we always assume that agents work only one period. Therefore, the opportu-
nity cost of investing in education is represented only by the amount of forgone consumption.
8
This assumption about the job structure is not at variance with empirical evidence: see
2
tional framework, agents compete for the better jobs by means of investment in
education (credentials), likewise in rent-seeking models.
9
Another peculiarity
of the model is that the signal role of school achievements does not come from
the equilibrium of a game with incomplete information, as in signalling mod-
els, but it is taken for granted, as a starting assumption. There are dierent
jobs with dierent pay, and their allocation is such that more educated agents
have higher chances of getting better jobs.
10
We assume that the process of
job assignment is uncertain: an agent can invest in education and, depending
on his learning abilities, can reach a particular level of credentials. The latter
inuence the probability of getting a high paying job, but it is never conclu-
sive. Credentials are obtained at school, several years before the application for
the position: therefore the future structure of the labour market (the demand
side) is unknown. Investing in education increases the chances of winning the
positional competition in the future, but the process is never deterministic: the
agent with better credentials cannot be sure to get the best position.
11
Our main interest regards the consequence of the institutional setting (the
schooling system and the labour and credit markets) on the distributive dy-
namics. If we consider an economy with risk-neutral agents and perfect capital
markets, independently from individual wealth, the individual innate abilities
determine the probabilities of getting the high-paying positions: in the long run
the distribution of wealth among the dierent dynasties will be ergodic, that
is, every dynasty will always have a positive probability of getting the highest
pay. However, if agents are risk averse and credit is rationed (due to possible
imperfections in the capital market), the asympthotic wealth distribution may
depend on the initial wealth, which means that it may no longer be ergodic.
The educational system can be seen as an institution whose purpose is to
provide people a signal for the job market that indicates their potential produc-
tivity. In the actual economy there are many dierences among the educational
systems of dierent countries (more or less private, more or less expensive
12
);
the results of the model can help explain, at least partially, these dierences.
For example, in the American educational system there is a small set of elitarian
scholastic institutions, which are very expensive and aordable only by individ-
uals with high wealth, or with a notable grant (Harvard, Yale, Princeton, etc..).
These institutions help eectively in the competition for a good job.
13
Rich
[13]. As time passes, the type of credentials necessary to get the top positions change. This
fact leads to the rst period uncertainty about the future assignment process.
9
See [21].
10
Spence (1973) is the rst model in which education is only a signal. Education works as
a signal related to the unobservable innate ability of workers; in this respect, more years of
education can mean a higher perseverance (which means fewer absenteeisms and a smaller risk
of abandoning the job) and other characteristics generally correlated with the scholastic cur-
riculum; Weiss (1995) writes: "better-educated workers are not a random sample of workers:
they have lower propensities to quit or to be absent, are less likely to smoke, drink or use illicit
drugs, and are generally healthier. [...] we would expect employers to favor better-educated
workers as a means of reducing their costs of sickness and job turnover". Employers hire on
the basis of the credentials, but the latter are only screening devices: the studies carried out
signal that the worker has a higher probability of belonging to the set of agents with greater
productivity.
11
We think that this approach is quite realistic: education increases the chances of success,
but it cannot assure a better job with certainty.
12
See [3] and [12].
13
Talented individuals who study at Harvard are bound to nd a much better job in compar-
ison to talented individuals who do not. This is not to say that anybody can get a degree from
3
agents can be willing to pay a great amount of money in order to weaken the
competition for high wage positions. Since this willingness to pay exists, there
are the conditions for the rise of an institution capable of giving a particularly
strong signal, that can exclude the poor by imposing high fees
14
. Of course, this
kind of analysis of the factors that determine the degree of social mobility is
only partial, because it neglects many other institutional aspects. Nevertheless,
the relationship between the level of initial wealth, the educational choices, and
the income dynamics, seems to be crucial.
15
We will show that in a strategic environment, a low wealth agent might not
be able to compete with high wealth agents for the high-paying positions, due
to capital market imperfections and risk-aversion. Moreover, we will highlight
how the educational institutions can somehow favor the competitors with high
wealth, and how this could lead to a misallocation of resources
16
; as a result the
society can be partitioned in dierent income classes, with a very low degree of
social mobility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the structure of the
model, paying attention to the specic assumptions about the rules of the posi-
tional competition in the labour market. In section 3 a case with risk aversion
and credit market imperfections is analyzed. Section 4 analyzes the distribu-
tional dynamics. Section 5 concludes with some comments. In the Appendix,
the results in the simple case with risk neutral agents are briey illustrated.
2 The model
The economy is composed of N agents who live for two periods. In the rst
period agent j has to decide how to allocate his own inheritance b
j
(t) among the
investment in education a
j
(t), the nancial investment s
j
(t) and consumption
c
j
(t), that is
17
:
b
j
(t) = a
j
(t) + s
j
(t) + c
j
(t) : (1)
In the second period the agent will have to decide how to allocate his income
deriving from previous investments between consumption and inheritance. The
Harvard. In the model we propose, learning abilities are heterogeneous, therefore any agent
can choose any amount of investment in education, but the credentials eventually achieved
depend upon individual abilities.
14
These institutions, having greater resources, are able to attract the best professors too.
Rarely in the real world the selection of candidates is based only on their willingness to pay,
since the access by means of grants of the most talented individuals, indipendently from their
wealth, allows for a raise in the value of entering into the institution itself. From this point
of view, attracting the most talented students raises the value of the signal awarded by the
institution; full exclusion of the (most talented) poors by means of prohibitive fees would
therefore not be coherent with the maximization of prot by the istitution (see [1]).
15
See [5] for empirical evidence about Italy and the United States. A high quality private
schooling system can be seen as a means of perpetuating inequality, while the observed degree
of social mobility can be seen as an unavoidable concession which is necessary to legitimate
the existing inequality. Lasch (1995) about this point says: \A high level of mobility is
not contradictory with a system of stratication which concentrates power and privileges in
a dominant elite. On the contrary, the circulation of the elite strengthens the hierarchical
principle, because it always provides new talented elite and legitimates their ascent as a
function of merit and not of birth". See also [22].
16
See [17].
17
Notice that a simple way to model credit rationing is to assume that s
j
(t) cannot be
negative or, more generally, inferior to a negative threshold.
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crucial hypothesis is that the return of the investment in education (the indi-
vidual labour compensation) depends on the investments of the other agents,
that is a positional competition in the job market exists. Let A
 j
be the vector
of investments in education of all the agents with the exclusion of agent j and
V = (v
1
; :::; v
N
) be the vector of individual innate learning abilities, so that
the return of the investment in education for agent j can be represented as
w (a
j
(t) ; A
 j
(t) ; V (t)). Therefore in the second period the budget constraint
is:
y
j
(t+ 1) = R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w (a
j
(t) ; A
 j
(t) ; V (t)) = b
j
(t+ 1) + c
j
(t+ 1) ;
(2)
where y
j
(t+ 1) is the agent j's income in period t+1; b
j
(t+ 1) is the bequest
for his ospring, and R(t+ 1) is the rate of return of the nancial investment.
The vector V (t) is common knowledge.
18
The simplest way to model the positional competition in education is to
suppose that the return of the investment in education is determined by a lottery,
whose probabilities are functions of the individual investments in education and
the innate abilities, so that agent j
0
s problem becomes:
max
c
j
(t);c
j
(t+1);b
j
(t+1);a
j
(t)
E [U
j
] = E [U (c
j
(t) ; c
j
(t+ 1) ; b
j
(t+ 1))] ;
subject to:
b
j
(t) = a
j
(t) + s
j
(t) + c
j
(t)
R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w (a
j
(t) ; A
 j
(t) ; V (t)) = b
j
(t+ 1) + c
j
(t+ 1)
c
j
(t)  0
c
j
(t+ 1)  0
a
j
(t)  0
b
j
(t+ 1)  0:
After substituting c
j
(t) and c
j
(t+ 1), we have:
max
b
j
(t+1);a
j
(t)
E [U
j
] = E [U (b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t) ; R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w (a
j
(t) ; A
 j
(t) ; V (t))+
 b
j
(t+ 1) ; b
j
(t+ 1))] ;
subject to:
b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t)  0
R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w (a
j
(t) ; A
 j
(t) ; V (t))  b
j
(t+ 1)  0
a
j
(t)  0
b
j
(t+ 1)  0:
18
Assuming instead that V (t) is unknown, would have dierent implications according to
the hypotheses about agents' attitude torwards risk. With risk neutral agents, and with
homogeneous prior beliefs about the vector V (t); nothing would change. With risk aversion,
agents' behaviour would be dierent, because the investment in education would assume the
role of a form of insurance against possible unfavourable realizations of the vector of learning
abilities.
5
In general, the rst order condition for b
j
(t+ 1) is:
U
0
b
j
(t+1)
U
0
c
j
(t+1)
= 1;
where the index represents the variable with respect to which U has been de-
rived. Notice that when there is no more uncertainty about the income of the
second period, the choice about the amount of bequest is deterministic (even
if still conditioned to the realization of the return of the investment in educa-
tion). Under general hypotheses on the form of U (i.e. omothetic preferences),
inheritance will be equal to a constant fraction  of second period income
19
:
c
j
(t+ 1) = (1  )  y
j
(t+ 1). Therefore we have:
b
j
(t+ 1) = max [  [R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w (a
j
(t) ; A
 j
(t) ; V (t))] ; 0] : (3)
Replacing (3) in the expected utility function, we have:
max
s
j(t);
a
j
(t)
E [U
j
] = E
h
^
U (b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t) ; R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w (a
j
(t) ; A
 j
(t)) ; V (t))
i
;
where
^
U is the indirect utility function modied in order to consider (3).
2.1 Imperfect capital market
The capital market can provide agent j with additional resources, so that it
becomes possible to invest an amount of money in education that is greater than
the bequest b
j
(t). However, if there are market imperfections, the investment
in education a
j
(t), besides the inferior limit equal to 0, also shows a superior
limit related to the level of inheritance b
j
(t) (initial wealth).
20
A simple hypothesis about the form of credit market imperfections, is not
to allow agents to borrow at all in the capital market, that is s
j
(t)  0. In such
a way, investment in education is constrained in the following manner:
0  a
j
(t)  b
j
(t) : (4)
This seems like a restrictive hypothesis, because in the second period agent
j gets an income which is at least equal to the minimum wage, so that the max-
imum borrowing threshold might be higher; however this does not qualitatively
aect the results.
2.2 Positional competition
The return of the investment in education does not follow the standard marginal
productivity rule. We assume that the process of job assignment is uncertain: an
19
However, this partition rule of income is very favorable to the fraction of income set
aside for bequest; a more realistic formulation would consider that, below a certain income
threshold, all the resources are devoted to consumption (a minimum consumption exists): in
such a case the ratio between inheritance and consumption would be equal to zero for low
levels of income and increasing with respect to it (i.e. almost-linear preferences).
20
For example, these imperfections could be caused by the impossibility of making the child
pay possible debts of the parents (indeed for hypothesis b
j
(t+ 1)  0), so that the lender
results as being subject to the risk of default (second period consumption cannot clearly be
negative).
6
agent can invest in education and, depending on his learning abilities, can reach
a particular credential. The probability of getting a high paying job depends
on the individual relative level of credentials, but this latter is never conclusive.
Investing in education increases the chances of winning the positional competi-
tion in the future, but the process is not deterministic: the agent with better
credentials can never be sure to get the best position.
Moreover, we suppose that there is a limited number of job positions relative
to a dierent level of wages. Therefore the two crucial points are:
1. the specication of the wage scale
2. the determination of the probability of each agent of getting a certain
position, given his credentials and those of his competitors.
We suppose that the wage scale is composed of K dierent possible wages
w
k
(where k = 1; :::K), relative to n
k
positions for each level of wage.
Let p
k
(a
j
(t) ; A
 j
(t) ; V (t) ; n
k
) be the probability that agent j gets a return
equal to w
k
, given his investment a
j
(t), the vector of the investments of the
other agents A
 j
(t) ; and the vector of individual innate learning abilities V (t).
Therefore, agent j's problem can be expressed as:
max
a
j
(t);s
j
(t)
E [U
j
] =
K
X
k=1
p
k
(a
j
(t) ; A
 j
(t) ; V (t) ; n
k
) 
^
U (b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t) ; R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w
k
) ;
subject to:
b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t)  0
R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w
k
 0 8k
a
j
(t)  0
s
j
(t)  0:
The form of the function p
k
is determined by the lottery used to assign the
available positions to the dierent agents. The assignment process, given the
investments in education, takes on the form of a sampling without replacement,
in which the positions relative to high wages are drawn out rst
21
. Since after
each sampling it is necessary to remove the investment of the drawn out agent
from the total calculation, and therefore to recalculate the single probability, the
calculus of the relative probabilities is quite complicated. Some simplication
is desirable at this point.
3 Job seeking with risk aversion: a simple case
with two agents
We choose to limit our attention to an economy with two agents, (agent i
and agent j) and with two levels of wages (w
H
(t+ 1) and w
L
(t+ 1), where
w
H
(t+ 1) > w
L
(t+ 1)).
22
21
See [2].
22
As the number of agents (and of possible job positions) increases, the positional compe-
tition becomes more complex. We study only the simplest case (2 2). For the simulation of
a similar model with a greater number of agents, see Orsini (1997).
7
The strength of the signal in the job market (the credential) is proportional
to the investment in education and to the individual innate abilities
23
. In par-
ticular, we assume that, if one agent invests a(t) in education, and he has an
ability to learn equal to v, he will obtain a schooling credential equal to v  a(t).
Normalizing agent i's innate ability (v
i
= 1), the parameter v
j
becomes an index
of agent j's relative learning ability. Agent j's probability of achieving the high
wage w
H
(t+ 1) is given by:
p
j
(t) =
v
j
 a
j
(t)
v
j
 a
j
(t) + v
i
 a
i
(t)
=
v
j
 a
j
(t)
v
j
 a
j
(t) + a
i
(t)
(5)
The probability of getting the high-paying job is directly proportional to the
investment in education
24
. The analogy with rent-seeking models is quite ap-
parent. Agent j's problem therefore becomes:
max
a
j
(t);s
j
(t)
E [U
j
] =
v
j
 a
j
(t)
v
j
 a
j
(t) + a
i
(t)

^
U (b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t) ; R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w
H
(t+ 1)) +
+
a
i
(t)
v
j
 a
j
(t) + a
i
(t)

^
U (b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t) ; R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w
L
(t+ 1))
subject to
25
:
b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t)  0 (6)
R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w
k
(t+ 1)  0 k = H;L (7)
a
j
(t)  0 (8)
s
j
(t)  0: (9)
Now we have to specify which kind of equilibrium we are looking for. Two
types of strategic equilibrium are possible: the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (with
simultaneous moves), and the Stackelberg equilibrium (with sequential moves).
In our model, the hypothesis of sequential moves means that the richest agent
can act as a leader, investing in education and so setting the standard of the
expenses which are necessary to acquire useful schooling credentials. Therefore,
when moves are sequential, we assume that the leader is always the wealthy
agent
26
. We expect the outcome with one of the competitors that chooses not
23
By "innate abilities" we mean the learning abilities that agents have after compulsory
(and free) education. They represent the eÆciency of the process which transforms higher
education into credentials.
24
A more general formulation is the following:
p
j
(t) =
(v
j
 a
j
(t))

(v
j
 a
j
(t))

+ (a
i
(t))

where  represents the degree of meritocracy of the process of positions' assignment. Indeed,
as  increases, agents investing more resources in education will be more favoured in the com-
petition. As an extreme case, when  = 0, the level of investment does not aect probabilities
at all.
25
Notice that the second constraint is redundant taking the fourth constraint on s
j
(t) into
account. However, the second constraint is not eliminated since it will become useful when,
analyzing the results with risk neutral agents in the Appendix , we compare the two cases,
with and without credit rationing.
26
The rich dinasties always act as leaders in setting the standards of consumption and
investment. Our hypothesis of a rich leader is then justied on the basis of the observation of
consuetudinary behaviour.
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to invest at all in education to be more probable in the case of sequential moves.
In the case of simultaneous moves, on the contrary, it is not likely that one agent
will not invest in education at all. Under uncertainty, agents' attitude towards
risk is crucial. We focus on the behaviour of risk averse agents, conning the
risk neutral case in the Appendix.
Risk aversion can be modeled by means of any concave utility function; we
consider this simple form:
^
U () = log (b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t)) +
^
  log (R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w
k
(t+ 1)) ; k = H;L
where
^
 =

1 
and  < 1 is the intertemporal preference factor
27
.
To simplify the analysis, we consider only the extreme case with maximum
borrowing constraints: agents are not allowed to borrow and agents always
prefer consumption to the investment in capital market, which means that the
variable s
j
(t) can be eliminated from the menu of choice (as if capital market
were absent).
Therefore, agent j has to solve the following problem:
max
a
j
(t)
E [U
j
] = log (b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)) + (10)
+
^
 

v
j
 a
j
(t)
v
j
 a
j
(t) + a
i
(t)
log [w
H
(t+ 1)] +
a
i
(t)
v
j
 a
j
(t) + a
i
(t)
log [w
L
(t+ 1)]

subject to:
b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  0 (11)
a
j
(t)  0 (12)
We analyze rst the Cournot, and then the Stackelberg equilibrium.
3.1 Cournot equilibrium
In this section we derive the Cournot equilibrium, corresponding to the inter-
section of the reaction curves of the two agents. The reaction curves can be
derived from the FOC. For agent j, the FOC is:
@E [U
j
]
@a
j
=  
1
b
j
  a
j
+
^
 
2
4
v
j
 a
i
 log

w
H
w
L

(v
j
 a
j
+ a
i
)
2
3
5
= 0: (13)
With the logarithmic utility function, the FOC automatically implies the
constraint on rst period consumption. If there were a minimum consumption
threshold, b
j
would have to be replaced with
~
b
j
= max [b
j
  ~c; 0]. An analogous
condition with inverse index holds for agent i.
27
With a logarithmic function, in order to have b
j
(t+ 1) =  y
j
(t+ 1) , the utility function
must be:
U = log c
j
(t) +  

log c
j
(t + 1) +


1  

log b
j
(t+ 1)

+D;
where D is a constant which depends on the values of  and , so that
^
 =

1 
.
9
From condition (13) we get agent j's reaction curve:
@E [U
j
]
@a
j
= 0,
(v
j
 a
j
+ a
i
)
2
v
j
 a
i
 (b
j
  a
j
)
=
^
  log

w
H
w
L

: (14)
One solution is a
j
= 0 and a
i
= a^
i
= v
j

^
  log

w
H
w
L

 b
j
; this means that
if agent i invests more than a^
i
, the optimal choice of agent j is to abandon
the competition (the optimal value of a
j
is 0 whenever a
i
 a^
i
)
28
. Notice that
a^
i
is a positive function of agent j's learning ability, which means that the
investment in education is made to counterbalance the opponent's ability. Each
agents values his own investment in education according to the level of his own
learning ability, which is the degree of eÆciency of his "credentials production
function".
In the Cournot equilibrium, given by the intersection of the reaction curves
of the two agents
29
, we have:
a
j
=

b
j
b
i

 a
i
; (15)
which, substituted into (14) yields:
a
j
= b
j

0
@
v
j

^
  log

w
H
w
L

 b
i
 b
j
v
j

^
  log

w
H
w
L

 b
i
 b
j
+ (v
j
 b
j
+ b
i
)
2
1
A
: (16)
Equations (16) and (15) highlight that, if the capital market is absent, each
agent invests a quantity of resources in education that is a positive function of
his wealth.
30
Notice that the optimal choice of agent i (likewise for j) belongs to
the interval [0; a^
i
), as we can easily draw from the calculation of the maximum
value of a
i
, that is
lim
b
i
!1
a
i
= v
j

^
  log

w
H
w
L

 b
j
which assures that (14) represents the part of the reaction curve where the
solution lies.
The following Proposition describes the Cournot equilibrium with risk aver-
sion.
Without capital market, the Cournot equilibrium of an economy with risk
averse agents is given by:
a

j
= b
j


v
j

^
log

w
H
w
L

b
i
b
j
v
j

^
log

w
H
w
L

b
i
b
j
+(v
j
b
j
+b
i
)
2

and a

i
= b
i


v
j

^
log

w
H
w
L

b
i
b
j
v
j

^
log

w
H
w
L

b
i
b
j
+(v
j
b
j
+b
i
)
2

:
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Analytically, this result is due to the negative sign of the rst derivative of agent j for
a
j
= 0 and to the negative sign of the second derivative
@
2
E
[
U
j
]
@a
2
j
in the interval [0; b
j
].
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Agent i's reaction curve is:
@E [U
i
]
@a
i
= 0,
(v
j
 a
j
+ a
i
)
2
v
j
 a
j
 (b
i
  a
i
)
=
^
  log

w
H
w
L

:
30
In equation (16) the expression in round brackets is the same for both agents.
10
If there were a minimum consumption ~c; that is
@E[U
q
]
@c
q
(t)
= +1 8c
q
(t)  ~c, b
q
would have to be replaced with
~
b
q
= max [b
q
  ~c; 0] ; for q = i; j.
Therefore, the borrowing constraints aect the quantity of investment in ed-
ucation but, if there is no minimum consumption, both agents will take part in
the competition. Intuitively, if there were a minimum consumption, it would be
possible for the rationed agent to not have enough resources to consume and in-
vest so that, even with a positive inheritance, he would not make any investment
in education. We observe that a lower inheritance can be counterbalanced by an
higher learning ability: from (16) we nd that p
j
=
v
j
b
j
v
j
b
j
+b
i
>
1
2
, v
j
 b
j
> b
i
.
Being aected by both investment and learning abilities, the job assignment
process is such that the most talented agent has the greatest probability of get-
ting the best job if and only if his initial wealth is not too lower than that of
his opponent.
3.2 Stackelberg equilibrium
In the present section we will show that, if agents are risk averse, the Stackelberg
equilibrium diers from the Cournot equilibrium. In models of rent-seeking, the
peculiar aspect of the Stackelberg equilibrium is the possibility that the follower
does not invest at all. Linster (1993) shows that if the prize is equally valued
by the two players, the Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the Cournot
equilibrium, but if the leader makes a higher evaluation of the prize, the follower
could refrain from taking part in the competition. Analogously, in our model
this means that with risk aversion, the poor agent can abandon the positional
competition since intuitively he "evaluates" the additional income he could earn
investing in education less than the leader. In particular, we will show that the
leader can be able to exclude the follower from the competition by making
an investment that is greater than a certain threshold, which is a function of
follower's wealth. In some cases, learning ability heterogeneity can only mitigate
this eect and, as we will show in section 4, it might not aect the distributive
dynamics.
In the following we will always assume that agent i is the leader and agent
j the follower, analyzing the case with b
i
> b
j
.
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The rst step is to nd the
follower's reaction curve, which is given by the FOC (14). Considering also that
for a
i
 a^
i
= v
j

^
  log

w
H
w
L

 b
j
the curve (14) lies in the negative quadrant,
the reaction curve of agent j for a
i
 a^
i
is a
j
= 0 (when leader's investment
31
See note 26.
11
exceeds a^
i
, the optimal choice of the follower is to not invest)
32
. Therefore, the
follower's reaction curve is:
a
j
(a
i
) =
(
 a
i
(2+)+
p
a
i
(a
i
+4a
i
+4v
j
b
j
)
2v
j
if a
i
< v
j
 b
j
 
0 if a
i
 v
j
 b
j
 
(17)
where  =
^
  log

w
H
w
L

.
The leader maximizes utility, taking into account that his own decision af-
fects the choice of the follower:
max
a
i
;s
i
E [U
i
] = log (b
i
  a
i
) +
^
 

a
i
a
i
+ v
j
 a
j
(a
i
)
 log (w
H
) +
v
j
 a
j
(a
i
)
a
i
+ v
j
 a
j
(a
i
)
 log (w
L
)

:
The FOC for the leader is then:
@U
i
@a
i
=  
1
b
i
  a
i
+ v
j

^
  log

w
H
w
L

"
a
j
(a
i
)  a
i

da
j
da
i
(v
j
 a
j
(a
i
) + a
i
)
2
#
= 0:
From (14) we can calculate a
j
(a
i
) and
da
j
da
i
, which substituted into the pre-
vious equation yield
33
:
@U
i
@a
i
=  
1
b
i
  a
i
+
4  
2
 a
i
 b
j
 v
j
M (a
i
; b
j
; v
j
; )  [M (a
i
; b
j
; v
j
; )    a
i
]
2
; (18)
where M (a
i
; b
j
; v
j
; ) =
p
  a
i
 (  a
i
+ 4  a
i
+ 4  v
j
 b
j
).
Let a
i
be the value of a
i
which makes
@U
i
@a
i
equal to zero:
@U
i
@a
i




a
i
=a
i
= 0
Notice that a
i
is never greater than a^
i
, since a^
i
is enough to exclude agent j.
Moreover it can be shown that
@
2
U
i
@a
2
i
< 0, lim
a
i
!0
@U
i
@a
i
= +1 and lim
a
i
!b
i
@U
i
@a
i
=  1,
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Another way to see this point is by dening the dierence between the utility values in
the two cases: with and without a positive investment in education:
E [U
j
] = E [U
j
(a
j
; a
i
)]  U
j
(0; a
i
) ;
which is equal to:
E [U
j
] = log

b
j
  a
j
b
j

+  
2
4
v
j
 a
j
 log

w
H
w
L

v
j
 a
j
+ a
i
3
5
:
By calculating E [U
j
] with a
j
= 0 we get:
E [U
j
]  0, a
i
 a^
i
= v
j
   log

w
H
w
L

;
which means that, if a
i
 a^
i
; then it is not convenient for agent j to invest.
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In particular:
da
j
da
i
=  

2 + 
2  v
j

+

2
 a
i
+ 4    a
i
+ 2    v
j
 b
j
2  v
j

p
  a
i
 (  a
i
+ 4  a
i
+ 4  v
j
 b
j
)
:
12
so that the sign of
@U
i
@a
i
in a
i
= a^
i
allows us to distinguish if both agents invest
in education or if only the leader does:
@U
i
@a
i




a
i
=a^
i
 0, a
i
= a^
i
=) a
j
= 0 (19)
In Figure 1 an example of the follower's reaction curve (in light grey) and of
the leader's utility U
i
(in dark grey) is shown:
Figure 1 - The graph is drawn assuming b
j
=1, v
j
=1, b
i
=4, w
H
=4, w
L
=1 and
^
=0.6, so
that a^
i
=0.8318 and
@U
i
@a
i



a
i
=a^
i
=0.0375. On the orizontal axis the variable a
i
is measured. It
can be noted that U
i
reaches its maximum when a
i
=a^
i
, as we know from (19).
Replacing the value of a^
i
into (18), it is possible to demonstrate that
@U
i
@a
i




a
i
=a^
i
 0, b
i
 2 

1 +
^
  log

w
H
w
L

 v
j
 b
j
;
that is to say, in order to have a
i
= a^
i
and a
j
= 0 (see (19)), b
i
has to be much
greater than b
j
(if v
j
> 1).
34
The following Proposition describes the Stackelberg equilibrium with risk
aversion.
Without capital market, the Stackelberg equilibrium of an economy with
risk averse agents (where agent i is the leader and agent j is the follower), is
34
This result is quite intuitive: given agent j's investment and learning ability, the higher
is agent i's wealth, the lower is the risk that agent i perceives investing in education. The
logarithmic utility function is D:A:R:A: (decreasing absolute risk aversion).
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the following:
1) if b
i
< 2
h
1 +
^
  log

w
H
w
L
i
v
j
b
j
then a

i
= a
i
and a

j
=
 a
i
(2+)+
p
a
i
(a
i
+4a
i
+4v
j
b
j
)
2v
j
,
where a
i
solves
@U
i
@a
i



a
i
=a
i
= 0 and  =
^
  log

w
H
w
L

;
2) if b
i
 2 
h
1 +
^
  log

w
H
w
L
i
 v
j
 b
j
then a

i
=
^
  log

w
H
w
L

 v
j
 b
j
and a

j
= 0.
If there were a minimum consumption ~c; that is
@E[U
q
]
@c
q
(t)
= +1 8c
q
(t)  ~c, then
b
q
would have to be replaced with
~
b
q
= max [b
q
  ~c; 0] ; for q = i; j.
From Proposition 3.2 we can conclude that a great distributive inequality
involves an ineÆcient level of investment in education; indeed we notice that if
the richer agent has an amount of wealth b
i
greater than 2
h
1 +
^
  log

w
H
w
L
i
v
j
times that of the poorer (agent j), he will always invest
^
  log

w
H
w
L

 v
j
 b
j
. By
increasing agent j's resources, we would get, besides a decrease of inequality, an
increase of the investment in education (case 1 of Proposition 3.2). Also notice
that a higher learning ability of the follower (that is v
j
> 1) is not a suÆcient
condition for a positive investment in education by both agents if the follower
is much poorer than the leader.
4 Distributive dynamics
To analyze the dynamics of the wealth distribution between the two dynasties,
we need to specify the temporal evolution of the two exogenous variables:
w
H
(t)
w
L
(t)
and v
j
(t): We assume that the wage ratio remains constant over time (
w
H
(t)
w
L
(t)
=
w
H
w
L
8t) and that the relative learning ability v
j
(t) is uniformly distributed on
the interval [v
min
; v
max
], with v
min
> 0 and E [v
j
(t)] = 1 (the two agents have
the same learning ability on average).
From (3) we know that the inheritance is equal to a quota  of second period
income: it is then equal to   w
H
or to   w
L
.
The dynamics relative to the two types of strategic equilibria is dierent
35
.
We rst analyze the Cournot case.
4.1 Cournot equilibrium
From Proposition 3.1 we calculate the transition probabilities for agent j, re-
ported in the following Table
36
:
wH (t+ 1) wL (t+ 1)
wH (t)
v
j
w
H
v
j
w
H
+w
L
w
L
v
j
w
H
+w
L
wL (t)
v
j
w
L
v
j
w
L
+w
H
w
H
v
j
w
L
+w
H
35
For the risk neutral case, see the Appendix.
36
If there were a minimum consumption threshold ~c and   w
L
< ~c, then the transition
probabilities for agent j would become:
w
H
(t+ 1) w
L
(t+ 1)
w
H
(t) 1 0
w
L
(t) 0 1
that is, the distributive dynamics would be non ergodic.
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Being
w
H
(t)
w
L
(t)
a constant and v
j
(t) > 0 8t; every transition probability is
positive and depends on the values of
w
H
w
L
and v
j
. This means that the dynamics
is ergodic because every agent always has a positive probability of getting any
kind of job.
From Proposition 3.1 we can calculate the aggregate investment in education
A (t) = a

j
(t)+a

i
(t) and the aggregate credentials C (t) = v
j
(t) a

j
(t)+a

i
(t),
which can be interpreted as a proxy of the aggregate human capital. It is
possible to show that
@A
@v
j
> 0 , v
j
<
b
i
b
j
and that
@C
@v
j
> 0 8v
j
. The rst
result comes from the strategic nature of the model: the less talented agent
invests more in education as v
j
increases, but only up to a point: if the distance
in the learning abilities becomes greater than the wealth ratio, he decides to
invest less resources in positional competition, leading to an aggregate decrease
of investment. The most talented agent always invests more resources as his
relative learning eÆciency increases, leading to greater aggregate credentials
(but not always to greater aggregate investment) as the distance between the
individual abilities increases.
It is worth making a more in depth analysis of dynamics, focusing on the
possible eect of the wage scale on the growth rate. If we suppose that aggregate
credentials C are a proxy of the level of human capital and that this latter
is the only productive factor, then the output of period t can be expressed
as Y (t) =   C (t  1) where  > 0; moreover letting  >
1
2
be the quota
of output attributed to the high wage position, we get w
H
=   Y (t) and
w
L
= (1  )  Y (t). To analyze the long run dynamics we set v
j
equal to
its expected value (v
j
= 1) and, without being less general, b
j
=   w
L
and
b
i
=   w
H
. Then we obtain:
Y (t+ 1) =   C (t) =   Y (t)   
2
4
^
  (1  )   log


1 

^
  (1  )   log


1 

+ 1
3
5
from which the growth rate is obtained:
g
Y
=
Y (t+ 1)
Y (t)
  1 =    
2
4
^
  (1  )   log


1 

^
  (1  )   log


1 

+ 1
3
5
  1
We notice that g
Y
is positively aected by  ,
^
 and  and in a non linear
way by . Deriving g
Y
with respect to  we obtain
dg
Y
d
=    
^
 
2
6
4
1  (2    1)  log


1 

h
1 +   (1  ) 
^
  log


1 
i
2
3
7
5
that is,
dg
Y
d
 0,   ^ (20)
where ^  0:823959 solves log


1 

=
1
2 1
37
. Therefore, for  = ^ the
economy performs the maximum growth rate. In other words, to maximize
37
It is easy to demonstrate that ^ is the only solution in the interval

1
2
; 1

.
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the growth rate a certain wage dierence is necessary. Intuitively, too small
a dierence between high and low wages discourages agents from investing in
education to get the best job and, if education also determines the level of
output, this underinvestment causes a lower growth rate.
The following Proposition describes the distributive dynamics with risk aver-
sion.
In an economy where agents are risk averse and equilibrium is Cournot, the
distributive dynamics is ergodic, except in the case with a minimum consump-
tion threshold ~c and   w
L
< ~c.
Aggregate investment in education can be both a positive and a negative func-
tion of learning ability v
j
, while aggregate credentials are always a positive
function of v
j
.
Finally, if aggregate credentials are a proxy of the level of human capital, then
the growth rate is maximized when the high wage receives a quota of output
equal to 0:823959.
The relationship between wage inequality and growth is not monotonic. It
is necessary to have a clear distinction between high-paying positions, which are
mainly allocated to educated workers, and low-paying positions. This dierence
gives agents the incentives to invest in education. If the school is nanced by
means of progressive income taxes, these latter should not be too progressive,
in order to mantain the right degree of (net) wage dierentiation. If the wage
dierence is too high, the aggregate investment in education can decrease, due
to the fact that the poor dynasties have not enough resources to compete
38
.
4.2 Stackelberg equilibrium
In the Stackelberg equilibrium, assuming that agent j is the follower and agent
i is the leader (b
i
 b
j
), we nd that the follower will not invest in education
if b
i
 2 
h
1 +
^
  log

w
H
w
L
i
 v
j
(t)  b
j
(see Proposition 3.2), where b
i
=   w
H
and b
j
=   w
L
. To have a stable dichotomy in the wealth distribution it is
necessary that:
  w
H
 2 

1 +
^
  log

w
H
w
L

 v
j
(t)    w
L
;
that is,
w
H
w
L
 2  v
j
(t) 

1 +
^
  log

w
H
w
L

:
Dene

w
H
w
L


such that

w
H
w
L


= 2  v
j
(t) 
h
1 +
^
  log

w
H
w
L


i
, so that for

w
H
w
L



w
H
w
L


the follower never invests in education. As one could expect,
the wage scale, together with the learning abilities, is crucial in establishing the
investment in education
39
. We note that if
38
Comparing Italy and the U.S.A., we see that the italian wage dierentials are much lower,
but the human capital growth rate is higher (see [5]). This evidence could be rationalised on
the basis of a value of  which is too high in the U.S.A.
39
Note that the value of

w
H
w
L


depends on the realization of v
j
(t).
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vmax
<
w
H
w
L
2 
h
1 +
^
  log

w
H
w
L
i
then the distributive dynamics is non ergodic,
40
that is
wH (t+ 1) wL (t+ 1)
wH (t) 1 0
wL (t) 0 1
The following Proposition describes the distributive dynamics with risk aver-
sion.
In an economy where agents are risk averse and equilibrium is Stackelberg,
the distributive dynamics can be non ergodic, in particular:
1) if

w
H
w
L

<

w
H
w
L


the distributive dynamics is ergodic;
2) if

w
H
w
L



w
H
w
L


the distributive dynamics is not ergodic because the poorer
agent never invests, where

w
H
w
L


solves

w
H
w
L


= 2 v
max

h
1 +
^
  log

w
H
w
L


i
.
Likewise in the Cournot equilibrium, when there is a minimum consumption
threshold ~c, the distributive dynamics is non ergodic if   w
L
< ~c.
This result can have interesting economic implications. The possibility that
the distributive dynamics is non ergodic involves both a static and a dynamic
ineÆciency. In particular, if the richest agent moves rst (competition is se-
quential), the growth rate can be sub-optimal. By nancing schools with public
funds, the poor agent can become able to invest in education, and the dicothomy
can be overcome. However, the amount of public nancing is constrained by
the condition on the optimal value of ; which must not be less than ^.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the eects of credit constraints and risk aversion in
a model of positional competition in the labour market. The investment in
education has been modeled as a rent-seeking activity, which determines the
probabilities of getting a high-paying job.
With risk averse agents, the borrowing constraints cause a static ineÆciency
in both the Cournot equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium, but only in
this latter a non ergodic distributive dynamics can emerge.
41
Indeed, if the
wage dierence is rather high, it can be optimum for the leader to exclude
the follower from the competition, making an investment in education which is
directly proportional to the follower's ability and wealth.
42
This result does not
depend on the absolute levels of the two possible wages, but only on the ratio
between them; therefore it remains valid if we assume that the wages evolve
40
With the parameters choosen in the example of Figure 1, the condition for ergodicity is
v
max
 1; 092: It is suÆcient that the poor dynasty give birth to a descendant with a learning
ability which is 10% greater than that of the richer dynasty.
41
In the Appendix we show that with risk neutral agents, the distributive dynamics for both
equilibria is always ergodic (except for the case with a minimum consumption threshold).
42
With heterogeneous abilities, the possibility that the poor agent chooses not to invest
arises in the case with risk neutrality too, but it is a case of little interest, because it stems
only from the low level of learning abilities of the follower (see the Appendix).
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in time, preserving the value of the ratio.
43
The temporal evolution of the
dynasties' wealth also depends upon the (exogenous) realization of the innate
abilities of the descendants; in the sequential game (Stackelberg equilibrium),
the distributive dynamics can become ergodic if the range of possible values for
the innate learning ability is wide enough. Finally, we show that in the Cournot
equilibrium, in order to maximize the growth rate, a certain wage dierence is
necessary to give agents incentives to invest in education.
An interesting extension would come from the introduction of a time con-
straint, allowing for a rst-period unskilled job. In this case, the opportunity-
cost of investing in education would be increased by the amount of resources
forgone by the agent if he was not working in the rst period. The wage scale
would then be enriched, introducing at least three wage levels: for the unskilled,
for the skilled and for the top positions. A single agent would then face three
dierent perspectives: a) not to invest, and work for two periods as unskilled
44
;
b) to invest, losing the positional competition; c) to invest, winning the po-
sitional competition. The income stratication and the distributive dynamics
would be dierent, and certainly more complex.
43
Note that a constant wage ratio is compatible with an increasing wage dierence.
44
Even a fourth level of wage could be introduced, assuming that the rst and the second
period wages, for the unskilled worker, might dier (i.e., for learning by doing considerations).
Second period wage could also be considered as an expected value, if unemployment exists.
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A The case with risk neutrality
The simplest form of risk neutral preferences is the linear one:
^
U
j
() = b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t) +   [R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) + w
k
(t+ 1)] ; k = H;L
(21)
where, in terms of the preceding notation, under the hypothesis of a linear utility
function,  =
^
  (1  ) :
Therefore, with risk neutral agents the problem becomes:
max
a
j
(t);s
j
(t)
E [U
j
] = b
j
(t)  a
j
(t)  s
j
(t) + (22)
+  

R(t+ 1)  s
j
(t) +
v
j
 a
j
(t)  w
H
(t+ 1) + a
i
(t)  w
L
(t+ 1)
v
j
 a
j
(t) + a
i
(t)

A.1 Cournot equilibrium
In order to nd the Cournot equilibrium, it is necessary to calculate the agents'
reaction curves by means of the two rst order conditions (FOC) of problem
(22), which are the following:
@E [U
j
]
@s
j
=  1 +R(t+ 1)   = 0 (23)
@E [U
j
]
@a
j
=  1 +  
"
v
j
 a
i
 (w
H
  w
L
)
(v
j
 a
j
+ a
i
)
2
#
= 0 (24)
where the time index is omitted whenever this does not give rise to confusion
in the notation.
On the other hand, notice that, if borrowing were possible and b
j
< a
j
(a
i
),
where a
j
(a
i
) indicates the optimum value of a
j
, then agent j would borrow
s
j
= a
j
(a
i
)   b
j
(rst period consumption has to be non negative, see (6)).
Moreover, if there were a minimum level of consumption ~c, then the loan would
be equal to s
j
= a
j
(a
i
)   b
j
+ ~c. (ignoring the constraint on the consumption
of the second period).
Condition (24) states that the optimum value of a
j
has to satisfy the follow-
ing:
v
j
 a
i
 (w
H
  w
L
)
(v
j
 a
j
+ a
i
)
2
=
1

: (25)
This only represents the implicit reaction curve of agent j, ignoring possible
borrowing constraints.
Since
@
2
E[U
j
]
@a
2
j
is negative, equation (25) admits only one solution, that we
indicate with a
j
(a
i
). If a
j
(a
i
) > b
j
, for the constraints (6) and (9) (non nega-
tivity of consumption in the rst period and of s
j
), the admissible choice will
be constrained and equal to b
j
. Moreover, if there were a minimum level of con-
sumption ~c (so that if inheritance is inferior to this threshold, all the resources
must be devoted to consumption, which in turn means that the marginal utility,
when consumption is under the threshold ~c; approaches + 1), the investment
in education would be constrained to max [b
j
  ~c; 0].
19
In order to nd the value of a
j
(a
i
) ; suppose that both agents are not con-
strained, so that the intersection of the two reaction curves
45
determines the
optimal amount of investment in education, which is the same for both agents:
a

j
= a

i
=
v
j
   [w
H
  w
L
]
(1 + v
j
)
2
: (26)
If agent j is constrained, that is a

j
= b
j
, agent i modies his own choice; in
particular:
a

i
=
q
v
j
   [w
H
  w
L
]  b
j
  v
j
 b
j
:
The following Proposition describes the Cournot equilibrium for an economy
with risk neutral agents:
In the Cournot equilibrium with risk neutral agents, investment in education
depends on the characteristics of the capital market:
1) if the capital market is imperfect (there are borrowing constraints: s
j
 0),
then
a

j
= min
h
b
j
;
p
v
j
   [w
H
  w
L
]  b
j
  v
j
 b
j
;
v
j
[w
H
 w
L
]
(1+v
j
)
2
i
and
a

i
= min
h
b
i
;
p
v
j
   [w
H
  w
L
]  b
j
  v
j
 b
j
;
v
j
[w
H
 w
L
]
(1+v
j
)
2
i
;
2) if the capital market is perfect, then a

j
= a

i
=
v
j
[w
H
 w
L
]
(1+v
j
)
2
.
If there were a minimum consumption ~c; that is,
@E[U
q
]
@c
q
(t)
= +1 8c
q
(t)  ~c, b
q
would have to be replaced with
~
b
q
= max [b
q
  ~c; 0] ; for q = i; j.
We notice that the borrowing constraints could induce agents to underinvest
in education: it is possible that in the Cournot equilibrium one agent does not
invest at all, having insuÆcient resources in the rst period (for instance b
j
(t) =
0), while the other invests a quantity " > 0; that is as small as he wishes, getting
the high wage w
H
. Finally, if there is a minimum level of consumption for each
period, it is possible that the rationed agent may not set aside any resources to
invest, so that, even though he received a positive inheritance, he does not make
any investment in education. Ceteris paribus, heterogeneous learning abilities
favour the most talented individuals in the positional competition. Without
borrowing constraints, from (5) and (26) we get that p
j
=
v
j
1+v
j
, which means
that p
j
>
1
2
, v
j
> 1
A.2 Stackelberg equilibrium
The Stackelberg equilibrium is found assuming that one agent (the follower)
considers the choice of the other agent (the leader) as given and maximizes
accordingly.
Assume that agent i is the leader while agent j is the follower. In the rst
step we nd the optimum choice of the follower depending on the choice of the
leader; this is given by the FOC (25) if agent j is not rationed, and by b
j
in the
other case
46
.
45
Agent i's implicit reaction curve is specular to (25):
v
j
 a
j
 (w
H
  w
L
)
(v
j
 a
j
+ a
i
)
2
=
1

:
46
If there were a minimum consumption, it would be given by max [b
j
  ~c; 0].
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The leader maximizes utility, taking the inuence of his own action on the
decision of the follower into account:
max
a
i
;s
i
U
i
= b
i
  s
i
  a
i
+  

a
i
 wH + v
j
 a
j
(a
i
)  wL
v
j
 a
j
(a
i
) + a
i
+R(t+ 1)  s
i

:
The FOC with regard to s
i
is the same as it is in the Cournot case (see (23)),
while the FOC with regard to a
i
is:
@U
i
@a
i
=  1 +  
2
4
v
j
 (w
H
  w
L
) 

a
j
(a
i
)  a
i

da
j
da
i

(v
j
 a
j
(a
i
) + a
i
)
2
3
5
= 0:
From (25) we can calculate a
j
(a
i
) and
da
j
da
i
, which substituted into the pre-
vious equation yield:
@U
i
@a
i
= 0, a
i
=
  (w
H
  w
L
)
4  v
j
(27)
Replacing a
i
in (25), we nd the optimal investment in education of agent
j:
a
j
=
  (2  v
j
  1)  (w
H
  w
L
)
4  v
j
(28)
Notice that, if v
j
<
1
2
; then the follower does not invest at all: if the poor
agent also has less learning ability, he abandons the competition for the high-
paying job. Moreover, in the Stackelberg equilibrium without borrowing con-
straints, we know from (27) and (28) that, if v
j
were equal to 1, the two agents
would invest the same amount of resources in education. If the follower is ra-
tioned, a
j
(a
i
) = b
j
<
(2v
j
 1)(w
H
 w
L
)
4v
j
and
da
j
da
i
= 0, so that
@U
i
@a
i
= 0, a

i
=
q
v
j
   (w
H
  w
L
)  b
j
  v
j
 b
j
:
Finally, if there is a minimum consumption ~c, then b
q
has to be replaced
with
~
b
q
= max [b
q
  ~c; 0] ; for q = i; j.
Therefore, we can conclude with the following:
The Stackelberg equilibrium with risk neutral agents is equivalent to the
Cournot equilibrium only in the case of homogeneous learning abilities, or in
the case of binding borrowing constraints. With an imperfect capital market,
the Stackelberg optimal choices dier from the Cournot case:
a

j
= min
h
b
j
(t) ;
p
  [w
H
  w
L
]  b
i
  b
i
;
(2v
j
 1)(w
H
 w
L
)
4v
j
i
and
a

i
= min
h
b
i
(t) ;
p
  [w
H
  w
L
]  v
j
 b
j
  v
j
 b
j
;
(w
H
 w
L
)
4v
j
i
:
If there were a minimum consumption ~c, then b
q
would have to be replaced with
~
b
q
= max [b
q
  ~c; 0] ; for q = i; j.
If v
j

1
2
, then a

j
= 0 (the follower does not invest).
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A.3 Distributive dynamics
In the Stackelberg case, we assume that v
min
=
1
2
, allowing us to ignore the
case in which the follower has much less ability in addition to less wealth in
comparison with the leader.
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If agents are risk neutral, then the Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria are
qualitatively similar as far as the distributive dynamics is concerned (see Propo-
sitions A.1 and A.2), so that we analyze only the Cournot case.
From (3) we know that the inheritance is equal to a quota  of second period
income: it is then equal to w
H
or to w
L
. Dening 
H
= w
H
 
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
)
(1+v
j
)
2
and 
L
=   w
L
 
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
)
(1+v
j
)
2
; we have three possible cases:
1. 
H
< 0 , where both agents are constrained;
2. 
L
> 0, where no agent is constrained;
3. 
H
> 0 and 
L
< 0, where only one agent is constrained, while the other
is not.
In the rst case the two agents always invest all their inheritance (b
j
and
b
i
respectively). The transition probabilities for agent j are reported in the
following Table
48
:
wH (t+ 1) wL (t+ 1)
wH (t)
v
j
w
H
v
j
w
H
+w
L
w
L
v
j
w
H
+w
L
wL (t)
v
j
w
L
v
j
w
L
+w
H
w
H
v
j
w
L
+w
H
while in the second case both invest
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
)
(1+v
j
)
2
, so that the the transition
probabilities for agent j are:
wH (t+ 1) wL (t+ 1)
wH (t)
v
j
1+v
j
1
1+v
j
wL (t)
v
j
1+v
j
1
1+v
j
.
The third case is the most interesting one, because we have one agent
who is rationed in every period; if agent j gets w
L
, then his ospring will
receive b
j
(t+ 1) =   w
L
, and as a consequence he will invest a

j
(t+ 1) =
  w
L
, while a

i
(t+ 1) =
p
  v
j
 w
L
   (w
H
  w
L
)   v
j
   w
L
, so that
p
j
(wH (t+ 1) =wL (t)) =
v
j
w
L
p
v
j
w
L
(w
H
 w
L
)
. Therefore the transition proba-
bilities for agent j will be
wH (t+ 1) wL (t+ 1)
wH (t)
v
j


p
v
j
w
L
(w
H
 w
L
) v
j
w
L

v
j

p
v
j
w
L
(w
H
 w
L
)+w
L

(
1 v
2
j
)
w
L
v
j
p
v
j
w
L
(w
H
 w
L
)+w
L

(
1 v
2
j
)
wL (t)
v
j
w
L
p
v
j
w
L
(w
H
 w
L
)
1 
v
j
w
L
p
v
j
w
L
(w
H
 w
L
)
.
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>From the last Proposition, we know that with v
j

1
2
the follower does not invest. We
can exclude this case, which is of little interest.
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If there were a minimum consumption threshold ~c and   w
L
< ~c, then the transition
probabilities for agent j would become:
w
H
(t+ 1) w
L
(t+ 1)
w
H
(t) 1 0
w
L
(t) 0 1
that is the distributive dynamics would be non ergodic.
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Since 
L
< 0; we have   w
L
<
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
)
(1+v
j
)
2
; which means that
p
j
(wH (t+ 1) =wL (t)) <
1
2
The richest agent has a greater probability of getting the high-paying job,
but the distributive dynamics is ergodic because p
j
> 0 8t.
We can observe that if there were not informational problems and credit
markets were competitive, R(t + 1) would be a function of the wage scale.
Consider the third case; in the rst period inheritance is equal to   w
L
, so
that the level of the necessary loan is equal to


s

j


=
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
)
(1+v
j
)
2
  w
L
: The
probability of getting the high wage is equal to p
j
=
v
j
1+v
j
, so that the expected
income is equal to
1
1+v
j
 (v
j
 w
H
+ w
L
) : This latter, in turn, must be enough
to repay the debt (the amount of loan plus the interests), that is R(t+1) 


s

j


.
Therefore the loan is granted only if the condition
v
j
(1+v
j
)(w
H
+w
L
)
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
) (1+v
j
)
2
w
L

R(t + 1) is satised, from which the competition among banks would involve
that R(t+ 1) =
v
j
(1+v
j
)(w
H
+w
L
)
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
) (1+v
j
)
2
w
L
.
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Likewise in the risk averse case, it is worth analysing the dynamics focusing
on the possible eect of the wage scale on the growth rate. If we suppose that
aggregate credentials C are a proxy for the level of human capital and that
this latter is the only productive factor, then the output of period t can be
expressed as Y (t) =   C (t  1) where  > 0: Moreover let  >
1
2
be the
quota of output attributed to the high wage position, so that w
H
=   Y (t)
and w
L
= (1  )  Y (t). To analyze the long run dynamics we set v
j
equal
to its expected value (v
j
= 1) and, without being less general, b
j
=   w
L
and
b
i
= w
H
. The third case, (distributive dynamics which is always ergodic, while
an agent is always rationed), which occurs when  > max
h

2( 2)
;
4+
2(2+)
i
,
seems to be the most interesting one. By simple algebra, we can calculate the
growth rate of output
g
Y
= [      (2    1)  (1  )]
2
  1
from which
@g
Y
@
 0,  
3
4
and therefore  = ^ =
3
4
is the division of output that maximizes the growth
rate. This result is analogous to what we found for the risk averse case.
The following Proposition describes the distributive dynamics with risk neu-
trality:
In an economy with risk neutral agents, the distributive dynamics is not
aected by the type of equilibrium we consider.
In the Cournot equilibrium three cases are possible:
1) if   w
H
<
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
)
(1+v
j
)
2
; then all agents are rationed and the distributive
dynamics is ergodic;
2) if   w
L
>
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
)
(1+v
j
)
2
; then nobody is rationed and the distributive dy-
namics is ergodic;
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Notice that banks can know v
j
given s

j
.
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3) if   w
H
>
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
)
(1+v
j
)
2
but   w
L
<
v
j
(w
H
 w
L
)
(1+v
j
)
2
; then only one agent is
rationed. The rationed agent has a lower probability of getting the high-paying
position, but the distributive dynamics is still ergodic.
In this case, considering the aggregate credentials as a proxy of the aggregate
level of human capital, the growth rate is maximized when the high wage re-
ceives a quota of output equal to
3
4
.
If there were a minimum consumption ~c; then the distributive dynamics could
be non ergodic if   w
L
< ~c.
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